Was style or substance at the heart of Democratic Party losses in 2024? Was it a failure to effectively govern in blue cities and states?

 

An audience member holds a Harris Walz sign as Kamala Harris takes the stage at the Democratic National Convention Thursday Aug. 22, 2024 in Chicago. (Photo: Lorie Shaull)

Every losing political party eventually decides it has a messaging problem. This is the great comfort of political professionals. If the problem is messaging, nobody important has to admit the governing philosophy failed. Nobody has to rethink the policies. Nobody has to apologize to voters. Nobody has to say, “We were wrong.”

You just need better slogans, better ads, better influencers, better turnout operations, better talking points, better “storytelling.”

And most of all, more money.

But what if voters heard the story just fine?

That is the question Democrats still seem unwilling to answer after 2024. Was the problem that Americans did not understand Democratic successes? Or was the problem that too many Americans did not experience those successes?

The party’s long-delayed post-election autopsy was supposed to help answer that question. Instead, it became another exhibit in the case against the party’s ability to tell itself the truth. The report was released late, disavowed by its own leadership, littered with caveats, and missing the kind of hard reckoning voters might reasonably expect after such a devastating loss. 

The report itself spent plenty of time on mechanics. It spent far less time on the obvious political question: why did so many voters look at the Democratic Party and decide it was no longer speaking to them?

That is not a communications issue. That is a trust issue.

Yes, Democrats can point to things they believe were unappreciated: infrastructure spending, job growth, climate spending, student-loan efforts, and other policy achievements. But politics is not graded like a policy seminar. Voters do not live inside a legislative spreadsheet. They live in grocery stores, gas stations, school pickup lines, emergency rooms, apartment searches, and city streets.

If the price of eggs is up, the rent is absurd, the border looks chaotic, the schools feel captured by activists, the streets feel disorderly, and the people in charge keep insisting everything is actually going well, the problem is not merely that the message failed to land. The problem is that the message sounds insulting.

This is especially true in blue cities and states, where Democrats have enjoyed the rarest luxury in American politics: the ability to govern without meaningful opposition. 

In places like Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York, and Portland, voters have had years to judge progressive governance not as an abstract theory, but as a lived reality. They can see the tents. They can smell the urine. They can watch businesses lock up toothpaste and deodorant. They can read about billions spent on homelessness while the crisis remains visible on the sidewalk. They can hear officials explain why the numbers are improving while their own eyes tell them the city is fraying.

At a certain point, “messaging” becomes a way of asking voters to distrust their own experience.

Los Angeles is the perfect symbol. The city has spent staggering sums on homelessness, passed new taxes in the name of housing, and produced a governing class fluent in compassion but much less fluent in results. Then came the Palisades fire, with its empty reservoir, strained water infrastructure, leadership controversies, and a public sense that basic competence had gone missing. 

Politics is not only about blame. It is about confidence. And when disaster strikes, voters notice whether their leaders look prepared, present, honest, and in command.

That is why a reality TV personality can suddenly become a plausible protest candidate in a city full of credentialed Democrat “adults in the room.”

Spencer Pratt is not really the point. His candidacy is a symptom. When serious people fail at serious things, voters start listening to unserious people who at least seem willing to admit, “This is broken.”

The same dynamic showed up nationally in 2024. Democrats wanted to run on Donald Trump as a threat to democracy. Many voters agreed he was chaotic, exhausting, and often reckless. But they also wanted to know what Democrats were offering besides institutional panic and moral lectures. What was the plan for affordability? What was the plan for immigration? What was the plan for crime and disorder? What was the plan for young men, Latino workers, black men, rural voters, and working-class families who did not feel seen by the party’s cultural obsessions?

Too often, the answer sounded like: trust us, the other guy is worse.

That can work for a while. It cannot carry a governing party forever.

The left says Democrats lost because they were too timid, too corporate, too loyal to Biden’s failures at home and abroad, and too unwilling to offer a transformational economic vision. 

The center says Democrats lost because they became too culturally radical, too beholden to activist groups, and too far from the median voter on crime, immigration, energy, race, gender, and schools. Both factions are trying to win the argument inside the party. But they agree on one important thing: the problem was not just bad phrasing.

The voters were not waiting for a better brochure.

Perhaps Democrats do need better messaging, but only in the way a restaurant with bad food needs better signage. Better signage might get people through the door once. It will not make them come back.

A political party earns trust by making life feel more stable, more affordable, more orderly, more hopeful, and more sane. If Democrats want to recover from 2024, they should stop asking why voters failed to appreciate them and start asking why so many voters stopped believing them.

The problem was not that Democrats forgot to tell voters everything was working.

The problem was that too many voters looked around and decided it wasn’t.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)